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Taylor's Soft Perennialism:
A Primer of Perennial Flaws in Transpersonal Scholarship
Glenn Hartelius

California Institute of Integral Studies
San Francisco, CA, USA
This response to Taylor's essay in this issue (p. 17) concludes that his notion of soft
perennialism is unworkable and shows no promise as a theory to explain spiritual
diversity. Numerous specific shortcomings of the paper are described, then it is used as
basis for identifying three broad categories of error that occur in some transpersonal
scholarship. Examples from Taylor's paper are supplemented with similar errors in
papers by other transpersonal scholars.
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of consciousness, participatory thought, pervasive consciousness, nondual, critical thinking

F

rom its inception transpersonal psychology has
been bedeviled by a tension between on the one
hand, scientific and scholarly approaches that
diminish the value of mystical, spiritual, and exceptional
human experiences, and on the other, uncritical
speculations invented to support the importance of these
dimensions of the person. More than one luminary in
the field has forged a reputation by penning an array of
popular books with appealing but inadequately or even
poorly founded notions, typically accompanied by a
few scholarly articles published in holistically oriented
psychology journals that give a semblance of credence to
their work. Given that transpersonal psychology has been
in a preliminary phase of development in which various
frameworks and constructs have been tried out, the field
has rightly given some leeway to these explorations.
The pages of transpersonal journals deserve to be
used to critically vet and winnow these ideas in the process
of building a field that demonstrates substantive value
and integrity. Such processes, though less common than
might be desired, are already present within transpersonal
scholarship—beginning perhaps in the mid-1990s with
critiques of Wilber's work (e.g., Ferrer, 1998, 2002, 2009;
Rothberg & Kelly, 1998; Wright, 1995, 1996). In concert
with these have been calls for more careful approaches to
philosophy (e.g., Ferrer, 2002), science (e.g., Friedman,
2002; MacDonald, 2013; Walach, 2013), and method
(Berkhin & Hartelius, 2011; Friedman, 2013; Hartelius,
2007, 2014). The current response to Taylor's paper is
offered in this constructive critical spirit.
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Taylor's (2016, this issue) essay on soft
perennialism is a worthy effort to advance the field, even if
its primary contribution is to illustrate that its particular
approach is wholly unworkable and shows no future
promise. There are aspects he gets right, most notably
his call for basing transpersonal scholarship in empirical,
phenomenological research rather than philosophy,
and suggesting that experiences reported as spiritual
awakening should be compared with quite similar
accounts of processes that occur outside of spiritual or
religious contexts. Taylor also noted correctly that a
number of early transpersonal scholars held perennialist
views, reviewed relevant critiques of Wilber's (e.g.,
2000) perennialist model, and affirmed observations
that Wilber's work retains the features of perennialism
even though Wilber (2006) himself has disavowed some
aspects of the approach. All of this reflects the presence
of some critical thought and analysis, which are much
needed in these areas of study.
Unfortunately, Taylor has not heeded his
own advice as he engaged his topic. Instead, he has
put forward a heavily philosophical and metaphysical
viewpoint, then twisted and turned to disavow the clearly
metaphysical nature of his position. He has claimed that
his is a perennial phenomenology rather than a perennial
philosophy, yet in his phenomenological research he
demonstrates a blindness to his own interpretive lens.
Analysis of qualitative data is a subjective process in
which the researcher needs to disclose biases in favor
of particular interpretations, strive to set these biases
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aside, and perhaps seek review of the analysis by others
with expertise in either the topic or in qualitative
research; rather than reporting such disclosures and
validation procedures in his research (Taylor, 2012a,
2012b), Taylor (2016) has instead claimed that evidence
for his pre-existing opinions emerged naturally out
of the phenomenological data. This is an alarmingly
unreflective claim that places even the validity of his
empirical work in serious question.
Equally disquieting is Taylor's opinion that
only a perennialist theory can account for similarities
of experience between individuals in different cultural
contexts. This seems to belie a lack of acquaintance
with basic notions of psychology, namely that a woman
in rural Kentucky may experience loneliness in a way
that is quite resonant with how it is felt by a woman
who works in a high government position in Kuala
Lumpur, because humans share quite similar DNA and
physiology. An explanation that relies on neuroscience
and phenomenology rather than on belief in some sort of
pervasive consciousness that is claimed to be the basis of
all existence, seems both more parsimonious and more
credible.
Rather than focusing solely on the limitations
of Taylor's paper, what may be of greater value is to
consider three types of problematic assumption and
argument that appear within it, and illustrate how these
also occur in writings of other transpersonal scholars.
In this way, Taylor's work may serve as a sort of primer
for somewhat common fallacies and limitations in
transpersonal scholarship.

physical reality—it is metaphysical because Wilber
has made an unfalsifiable claim about the ultimate
nature of reality. The term metaphysical derives from
meta ta physica, referring to one of Aristotle’s works
that speculated on being, existence, and first principles
(Gifford, 2015)—in other words, on the true nature of
reality. A more common contemporary understanding
is that metaphysics refers to subjects that cannot be
examined scientifically. Wilber's nondual is metaphysical
in both of these senses.
While a nondual ultimate is difficult to
imagine, let alone experience, metaphysical claims can
also be made about physical objects, or about sensate
experiences. A claim that the Empire State Building is
the tallest building in New York City is demonstrably
false; a claim that it is at the center of the universe is a
metaphysical claim because there is no way to determine
whether or not this is the case. The fact that the building
can be seen and touched and ascended by elevator
does not in any way lessen the metaphysical nature of
this claim, for in order to be true this implies that the
universe must have a finite, measurable size, and that
it must be centered on New York City. While few New
Yorkers would dispute the latter point, both are claims
about the cosmos that are untestable.
Other authors such as Taylor (2016) and
Blackstone (2006) have similarly inserted metaphysical
claims about the nature of reality. For example, Taylor's
(2016) model proposes that there is an
all-pervading spiritual force that constitutes the
essence of one's being and of everything else that
exists. ...
Spiritual experiences occur ... when one
transcends the separateness and automatized
perception of one's normal state of being, and
experiences a world that is radiantly alive with spiritforce, and sense that one shares their being with
everything around and with the force itself. (p. 34)

Out of Thin Air:
Metaphysical Assertions
common problem in transpersonal scholarship
is the presence of unacknowledged metaphysical
concepts. Some such instances are obvious. For example,
it is clear to any fair reader that Wilber's (e.g., 2000,
2006) notion of a nondual ultimate is metaphysical.
The nondual is by Wilber's definition the ultimate
source of all reality, the paper upon which any form is
written (Wilber, 2006). As such, it is beyond any of its
manifestations such as sense experience or a mind that
might perceive such experience. Such an ultimate would
seem by definition to be transcendent beyond any formal
method that might wish to verify its presence.
Yet Wilber's nondual is metaphysical not
because it is transcendent—that is, beyond conventional

Taylor seems to believe that because this force is
immanent rather than transcendent, and linked to
sensate experience, that his claim is not a metaphysical
one. Yet the claim that a pervasive spirit-force constitutes
the essence of reality is a metaphysical assertion, whether
or no Taylor intends it to be so. One might collect reports
from individuals who have experienced the world as if it
is radiantly alive with spirit-force, but even if this spiritforce could be measured, this would not be evidence
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that spirit-force is the essence of one's being or of all the
world.
A notably similar claim has been made by
Blackstone (2006) regarding
the experience of a subtle, all-pervasive expanse of
consciousness pervading one’s internal and external
experience as a unified whole. The Asian teachings
that describe this type of nondual experience
consider this subtle consciousness to be the essence
of being. (p. 27)
In recent published dialogue with Blackstone (2016,
this issue), she has stated that "I do not claim in my
writing or teaching to understand either the nature of
consciousness or the structure of reality. I do not teach
a philosophy or a metaphysical system." However that
may be, the suggestion that a subtle experience of
pervasive nondual consciousness is the essence of being
is, as with Wilber and Taylor, an unfalsifiable assertion
about the founational nature of reality—and as such it is
a metaphysical assertion.
It is probably not possible to remove all
metaphysical assumptions from any context, including
science. However, these are particularly problematic when
they are unconscious, unacknowledged, or even denied,
and especially when they are central to a particular idea
or line of argument. Transpersonal scholars would do
well to gain a clear understanding of what metaphysical
assumptions look like, to identify them when they are
used, to offer some explanation for why a metaphysical
stance seems called for or perhaps unavoidable in a given
context, and to acknowledge the vulnerabilities inherent
in metaphysical claims.
Slippery Equivalency:
Conflating Experienced States
with Metaphysical Claims
closely related problem concerns the conflation of
experiential states with statements about what those
experiences are supposed to mean. A personal anecdote
may serve to illustrate the issue.
When I was in my twenties, I went by myself to
a local holistic fair. A man in one of the exhibit booths
sat at a bare table wearing odd yellow-hued goggles. His
appearance and the fact that he did not seem to have
any product to sell piqued my curiosity. He told me he
taught people how to soul travel, and invited me to a free
class that was to take place a couple of weeks later. When
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I arrived at the class there were perhaps twenty others,
many of whom seemed to be regular students. We went
through an induction, then sat quietly with eyes closed,
observing whatever images appeared in imagination.
Then each person took a turn sharing what they saw.
One individual said she saw herself as a blue ball, with
other blue balls around her, and there was a golden ball
that came over and pricked her. "That means I am your
teacher," the man with the yellow goggles informed her.
Over the next half hour I figured out that this man was
likely making a six-figure income running nightly classes
in his home and interpreting the imagery of suggestible
individuals. I did not return.
When a person is told that if they have suchand-such experience, it means some particular thing,
then if they have that experience, they may simply accept
without question that it means what they have been
told it means. Yet an experience in and of itself has no
particular meaning; it is context that provides meaning.
The same epithet may have a very different impact if it is
shouted by a police officer with a gun, or if it is screamed
from the stage by a comedian.
Wilber's work (e.g., 2006) can be taken to
mean that the nondual is the ultimate reality, and that a
nondual state of consciousness is a direct and confirming
experience of this ultimate reality. Yet even in a simple
embodied state the conventional divide between subject
and object is shifted, softened, even dissolved (Hartelius,
2015a; Hartelius & Goleman, 2016); such an experience
need not be taken to mean that one has touched ultimate
reality or the essence of existence, or anything other
than a moderately shifted state of mind. Experiencing a
state that could be described as nondual does not affirm
Wilber's intuition about the structure of the cosmos.
Taylor (2016) has a similar approach, claiming
that the all-pervading spiritual force "is not a metaphysical
speculation, but can be experienced as a tangible reality"
(p. 31). Here a slippery equivalency is made between a
particular experience and a particular metaphysical
claim. Allegedly, if one feels some quality of presence
through oneself and one's surroundings, then this means
that there is an all-pervading spiritual force that is the
essence of being. Of course, an experience of this type
may be valued, but it does not necessarily mean any such
thing about the essence of being.
Blackstone (2006) has made a quite similar
claim, suggesting that feeling consciousness as a subtle
pervasive expanse of space in and around the body
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represents realizing nondual consciousness as one's own
nature. Here again a specific phenomenal experience is
taken as evidence for a particular metaphysical claim
about the nature of reality, which is entirely unwarranted.
(For a more detailed discussion see the Editor's Response
in Blackstone, 2016 [this issue]).
An additional example of highly questionable
equivalency is Forman (1999)—cited by Taylor (2016)—
who has claimed that experiences in which awareness
has no object reflect pure consciousness, and has suggested
that these events may provide evidence of a Wilber-style
ultimate reality. Yet such experiences could just as easily
be termed empty consciousness, which offers quite different
connotations. Here again, there is a bold assertion that a
particular kind of experience validates some metaphysical
claim about reality. In fact many other interpretations
of such experiences are also possible, and metaphysical
claims remain undemonstrable.
Perhaps consciousness is the source and fabric
of reality; this possibility cannot be denied or disproven.
Indeed, some have claimed that a kind of pervasive
nonlocal consciousness may be the only way to explain
various human capacities (e.g., Schwartz, 2015). Yet
other explanations may still emerge—and even if it were
possible to demonstrate that nonlocal consciousness does
somehow extend through space, this does not mean that
consciousness is the primary fabric of reality, nor that
it extends through all of the universe. Furthermore, the
ability of conscious to extend over distances would not
mean that the experience of something that seems to
be presence or consciousness in the space around one's
body is actually the same phenomenon that extends over
distances, rather than something else more local to the
person.
Even more central is the fact that in a context
where critical thinking is applied, a personal experience
cannot be used to validate a metaphysical claim. When
such a claim is advanced together with the advertisement
that "you can feel it for yourself," the "it" that can be
felt is not proof of the metaphysical claim. As noted,
the fact that one can physically experience the Empire
State Building is not evidence for a claim that it is at
the center of the universe. The simple yet notable shifts
in state of consciousness that occur when the experience
of conscious attending drops down from the head into
the body (Hartelius & Goleman, 2016), while likely
beneficial, should not be reified or obscured by outsized
claims about their meaning.

Leading the Witness:
Improper Use of Sources
ilber has been repeatedly criticized for
appropriating a wide variety of ideas without
crediting his sources; however, this issue is well enough
established that it deserves no more than passing mention
here. With Taylor (2016) the issue is use of inadequate
sources, and with Blackstone (2006) there is uncritical
interpretation of textual material.
One of Taylor's (2016) arguments for his soft
perennialism is that Ferrer's participatory thought is too
relativistic to account for similarities between spiritual
traditions. Participatory models are relational rather than
relativistic, but since even relativism puts no bounds
on possibilities for similarity, what Taylor may have
meant is that if there are significant similarities, only a
perennialist approach provides a satisfactory meaning
frame. While arguments based on personal preference for
certain explanations generally do not carry great weight,
the issue here is that in order to demonstrate how similar
awakening experiences are among a variety of traditions,
Taylor (2016) has cited a very few authors such as
Spencer, Stace, Eliade, Levy-Bruhl, Turnbull, Underhill,
Happold, and Suzuki, who, through their sympathetic
ideological leanings, have already interpreted their data
through a homogenizing lens that fits with Taylor's
thinking—an inadequate basis for evidence because the
sources consulted confirm the biases of the author.
For Blackstone (2006), the concern is that she
has relied on translations of textual materials from several
different traditions, and then compared these with each
other and with her own experiential descriptions. Even
descriptions from another contemporary culture need
to be considered within their own context in order to
ensure that a Western scholar's understanding of them
is accurate. When the source of description is translated
ancient texts from another culture, what appears to be
a description of experience may instead be metaphor or
poetic language, or even esoteric symbolism. Without
careful attention to obtaining an appropriate and critical
translation, and review by a scholar knowledgeable
in the particular text and culture, opportunities for
misinterpretation are too many to disregard. (For a more
detailed discussion see Hartelius, 2015b).
The work of Wilber, Taylor, and Blackstone
all contain ideas and descriptions worthy of attention.
However, when scholarly sources are omitted, or selected
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or used without proper care, the credibility of the
associated ideas is damaged.
		
Balancing Innovation
with Critical Thinking
cientific skeptics are often all too ready to dismiss
reports of exceptional human capacities and
experiences as irrational belief. Those in more holistic
approaches to psychology, on the other hand, may be too
ready to accept metaphysical assertions, to believe that
some experiential state is evidence for such assertions,
or to rely on substandard means for gathering evidence
to support such ideas. Just as healthy skepticism should
not imply prejudice or rejection, so sympathetic curiosity
should not imply uncritical acceptance.
The errors illustrated here are not the only ones
found in transpersonal scholarship, but they reflect failings
that occur more frequently than ought to be the case in the
literature of the field. The purpose of pointing out these
issues is encouragement toward more careful scholarship
and better research, rather than censure. As with any
scholarly field, a balance should be found between allowing
multiple, innovative, and sometimes unorthodox voices to
speak, and identifying inadequacies in scholarship that
could be remedied with additional care.
Taylor's (2016) soft perennialism is a notion
that likely has too many inadequacies to be of any real
use other than perhaps as a metaphor of how participants
in various spiritual traditions might be thought of as
exploring different parts of a shared landscape. This
metaphor does not translate well into psychological
theory, and it is unfortunate that Taylor's ideas were
not vetted more carefully before being disseminated as
a popular book. Those with advanced degrees, and the
credibility these degrees confer, have a responsibility to
educate their public readers carefully, rather than using
public forums to advance ideas that may be appealing to a
popular audience but lacking in the soundness that might
give them enduring value.
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